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NOTES
SPOT ZONING AS USE CONTROL
Just how far can the police powers of the legislative body go to effectuate land use control by means of spot zoning? This is a question recently
faced in the cases of Kissenger v. City of Los Angeles' and Robertson v.
The City of Salem 2 involving the question whether a spot zoning ordinance
passed by municipalities in order to depress land value for later purchase
at lower cost would be held valid or invalid.
At the outset it is necessary to recognize the problem of terminology
involved in the use of the term spot zoning.3 Generally, "spot zoning" is the
practice whereby a single lot or area is granted benefits which were not
extended to other land in the same use district.4 It is also, but more rarely,
used to describe the reverse proposition; that is, one in which a single lot
has burdens imposed upon it which are more rigid than those imposed upon
other properties within the same area.5 This latter definition will be our
concern.
Spot zoning in recent times has become a much discussed process. Controversy has arisen as to whether such a process should be allowed, and if
so to what extent. Arguments have been advanced condemning spot zoning ordinances on the ground that they interrupt comprehensive zoning
plans and that they tend towards favortism and monopoly. 6 However, this
conclusion is generally reached where the spot zoning ordinance favors a
limited area.7 Whether the same conclusion should be reached where the
burdens placed on the limited area are more rigid is another question.
Spot zoning in the sense where it benefits special areas is considered
repugnant to the general welfare of the public by many courts.8 The reason
for these decisions are based on the tests applied to all zoning ordinances. 9
Some jurisdictions contend that the validity of the ordinance depends upon
its being in "accordance with a comprehensive plan,"1o and the general view
1 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
" 191 F. Supp. 604 (9th Cir. 1961).
3Cases
discussed in Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263 (1957).
4 Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951);
ZONING AND PLANNING

RATHXOPHF,

§ 2 at 26 (3d ed. 1960).

RATHIKOPHF, ZONING AND PLANNING § 2 at 26 (3d ed. 1960).
6 Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904); Pacific Palisades Ass'n v. Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 Pac. 538 (1925); In re White, 195 Cal. 516, 234 Pac. 396
(1925).
7 To the effect that spot zoning in its general sense is ordinarily invalid see Bartram
v. Zoning Comm'n of Bridgeport, 136 Conn. 89, 68 A.2d 308 (1949); Parker v. Rash,
314 Ky. 609, 236 S.W.2d 687 (1951); Shaffner v. Salem, 201 Ore. 45, 286 P.2d 599
(1954); Page v. Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165 P.2d 280 (1946); Harmon v. Dallas, 229
S.W.2d 825 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); State ex rel. Miller v. Cain, 40 Wash. 2d 216, 242
P.2d 505 (1952). See also cases collected Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263 (1957).
8 Ibid.
' Cases discussed in Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 263 (1957).
10 Ibid.
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is that spot zoning in this general sense does not meet this test.' Spot zoning in the narrow sense herein discussed must meet the same tests; but
whether or not it meets them is still in question. These jurisdictions requiring a comprehensive plan seem to be in disagreement as to what is actually
meant by this term, their views ranging from a literal approach invalidating
any zoning ordinance not related to an existent over-all community plan
separate from the zoning ordinance 2 to the moderate view that the zoning
ordinance is not and need not be an integral part of another plan, but is3
itself the comprehensive plan contemplated by the zoning-enabling act.'
Spot zoning, in its rare sense, where it is used to describe the situation
whereby a single lot or area has burdens imposed upon it which are more
rigid than those imposed upon other properties within the same area, is a
separate consideration. Whether this use of spot zoning is defensible on the
ground that it corresponds to a need for flexibility, and that its use would
be for the good of the general welfare is questionable. Certain situations
such as the need to maintain public parks and public beaches when the
city cannot purchase because of lack of funds seem to call for such a use.14
Beyond this scope the question is one of extent.
The power to spot zone in California is found under the general zoning
authority.' 5 The courts normally will not interfere with zoning regulations,
including spot zoning regulations, even where the reasonableness may be
debatable.,' The presumption is that in absence of manifestly unreasonable classification, the wisdom of zoning ordinances is not a matter for the
court.' 7 The city council, in enacting a zoning ordinance, is presumed to
have acted reasonably, 8 in view of the large discretion vested in the legislative branch of the government with respect to exercise of police power. 9
The courts will uphold the validity of the measure unless it is clearly oppressive. In order to be held reasonable, a zoning ordinance must be necessary, non-discriminatory, and reasonably related to health, safety, morals,
and general welfare of the community.20 Can the use of spot zoning in the
presently considered rare sense fit into this acceptable definition?
In 1953, the California courts decided the landmark case of McCarthy v.
City of Manhattan Beach,2 1 which dealt directly with the problem of placing
burdens on a limited area which were more rigid than other areas. In the
ManhattanBeach case, the city adopted a zoning ordinance whereby plaintiffs land was zoned from residential to beach recreational. In effect this
zoning ordinance had the same results as a spot zoning ordinance since in
" Ibid.
12 Johnson v. City of Huntsville, 249 Ala. 36, 29 So. 2d 342 (1947).
's Bishop
4

v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 133 Conn. 614, 53 A.2d 659 (1947).
1 McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
5
2 CA . Gov'T CODE §§ 65800-06.
113Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
'7 City of Norwalk v. Auction City, Inc., 186 Cal. App. 2d 287, 8 Cal. Rptr. 781

(1960).

I8 City of Chico v. First Ave. Baptist Church of Chico, 108 Cal. App. 2d 297, 238
P.2d 587 (1951).
'0
McClain v. South Pasadena, 155 Cal. App. 2d 423, 318 P.2d 199 (1957).
20
Biscay v. City of Burlingame, 127 Cal. App. 213, 15 P.2d 787 (1932).
2141 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932 (1953).
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the area zoned from residential to beach recreational the plaintiffs land
was the only privately owned section. Prior to the enacting of the ordinance, the city had made known its intentions of purchasing the land as
soon as it could raise the necessary funds. In discussion with the plaintiff
both the mayor and the city attorney expressed their hope that the property
would not be sold or improved so as to increase the cost of its acquisition by
the public authorities. The court said that the testimony as to the motive
or purpose of the zoning ordinance was irrelevant as concerning its reasonableness.22 When the plaintiff attempted to get a re-zoning to residential,
claiming that the ordinance was a scheme to depress the value of the land
for later purchase for public park purposes, he was defeated. The city
argued successfully that any attempt to build residential homes on this
beach area would be hazardous and not within the general welfare, and that
the ordinance was passed in order to provide economic and social advantages and to conserve and promote public health, safety and general welfare. Therefore they were able to justify their zoning ordinance although
considerably diminishing the value of the plaintiff's land. Probably the
public use of the beach and the need for a public recreational area were
important factors in the upholding of the ordinance. However, the emphasis was placed on the "reasonableness"of the ordinance which standing
alone would not seem to be strong enough reason to justify the intentional
depression of the value of land preparatory to a later purchase. This case
seems to show that the court will allow spot zoning which places burdens
on a limited area in this particular situation, when the public interest is
directly involved, but are they willing to extend the scope of this decision?
In the recent cases of Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles2" and Robertson
v. City of Salem,"* comparable questions were presented. In both of these
cases, an attempted depression of the land for later purchase, by spot zoning ordinances was held unconstitutional. The courts without hesitation
showed that they did not intend to enlarge the scope of the Manhattan
Beach case.
In Kissinger, a spot zoning ordinance was passed which rezoned property from a zone permitting multiple dwellings to one restricted to single
dwellings and which restricted the use of plaintiff's property while leaving
all similarly situated property alone. The ordinance stated that the subject
property lies within the approach zone of the San Fernando Valley Airport;
that six unit multiple dwelling units had already started on a portion of the
property; and that the construction of similar improvements would create
an undue density of population at this location and that such zoning would
result in a minimizing of the number of buildings and result in fewer persons being affected by the operation of the airport. At this point, it seems
that the court could easily have decided in the city's favor according to the
California Government Code section 50485.2.25 But evidence was presented
22

Id. at 895, 264 P.2d at 940.

161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
F. Supp. 610 (9th Cir. 1961).
25 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 50485.2: Thus the Airport Approaches Zoning Law contain
23

24 191

an express finding by the legislature that ".... it is necessary in the interest of the public
health, public safety, and general welfare that the creation or establishment of airport
hazards be prevented."
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showing that a motion had been made by the city council in which the
Board of Airport Commissioners were requested to consider condemning
this property in order that same may be acquired on a basis of its present
value as vacant land for addition to the airport. Thus the additional factor
was introduced, a consideration of the propriety of a city depressing land
values to diminish the expense of eminent domain proceedings. The court
held that it was an invalid ordinance and was in violation of the California
Constitution, which holds that private property cannot be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.
In Robertson, the court, citing Kissinger as authority, reached a similar
decision. In Robertson, the city had passed an ordinance restricting the
area in which the plaintiff was located to single dwellings while the surrounding area was zoned for commercial enterprises. The reason given for
the ordinance was "the needs of the State of Oregon, together with reasonable control for the sake of beauty." Here was an attempt to keep the surrounding areas adjacent to the capitol and state buildings uniform and free
from any undesirable structures. The fact that business property was restricted by ordinance to residential use did not alone determine that the
ordinance was invalid or discriminatory,26 nor would a zoning ordinance be
void simply because the plaintiff's property depreciated in value because
of the re-classificationY.2 But, evidence appeared in excerpts from the Minutes of the Meetings of the Salem Planning and Zoning Commission and
Council and also from testimony of a prior member of Salem's Planning
Commission, that the city intended to purchase the land in eminent domain
proceedings at a later date. Consequently, the court ruled that this was
a use of the police power to take the land without due process or the payment of just compensation, and therefore, the ordinance was unconstitutional and void as to the landowner.
A comparison of Kissenger and Robertson brings into focus the basic
similarities between the two cases. Both cities in these cases, attempted to
pass ordinances which placed burdens on a limited area belonging to the
plaintiffs. Both cities attempted this limitation by spot zoning ordinances
which purported to be for the general welfare of the public; and both cities
purportedly had the intentions of later purchase of the land. In both cases,
the court found the ordinances to be in violation of the respective Constitutions, and invalidated the legislation.
However, in the Manhattan Beach case, essentially the same facts were
present. The city passed an ordinance purporting to be for the general
welfare; it was also proven that the city had the intention to later purchase,
and the ordinance also restricted the use of the plaintiff's property while
other surrounding property was not affected. Why then, did the court reach
a different conclusion in this case than in Kissinger and Robertson?
As already stated, it is important to notice that the Manhattan Beach
case involved the use of the land by the public. Here we have a factor not
present to such an extent in either Kissinger or Robertson. Even though the
fact that the land was being used by the public was not stressed in the
Manhattan Beach case it remained a strong influence. Coupled with a convincing argument for the validity of the ordinance, this could easily have
2
GReynolds
2

v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244, 83 P.2d 32 (1938).
7Smith v. Collison, 119 Cal. App. 180, 6 P.2d 279 (1931).

